Trick or Treaty?

12.11.2009
Juraj Antal

In the month of Halloween, important events took place in the life of the Lisbon Treaty. At times it seemed as if EU leaders really asked us whether we want a trick or a treaty. Ireland had its referendum on October 2. A group of Czech Senators from the upper house of the Czech parliament filed a complaint to the Czech Constitutional Court asking for interpretation on Lisbon treaty’s compatibility with the Czech Constitution. Polish President Kaczynski signed on Saturday, October 10. The Judgment came down November 3, clarifying that Lisbon is not unconstitutional and President Klaus signed it on the same day. If the anxiety and tension that preceded this decision materialised in Brussels, it could be cut with a knife. Czech Republic was told it is not going to get a Commissioner until the issue is resolved, President Klaus wanted the opt out clause from the European Charter of Fundamental Rights claiming Sudeten Germans could attack the Benes decrees, meanwhile the EU leaders inked this guarantee… But let us go back to the beginning.
If one takes the Constitutional treaty that was rejected by French and Dutch voters in referenda, this saga is stretching for almost a decade. The fact of the matter is; the Lisbon treaty was created to ease the internal working of the EU. It consolidates all the previous Treaties, starting with Rome, through Maastricht, and Nice to name but a few. These treaties were building on the one preceding it and added more integrative parameters to the Union. Now there will be no need to site all different types of treaties, Lisbon will be the one to cite. In addition it creates the long postponed position of a Common foreign service with a common foreign policy. This is not something new; the sceptics and opponents of this integrative move should know that the Common Foreign and Security Policy was adopted in 1999 and created the post of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (HR CFSP). Even before that a European army and Foreign Service were on the discussion table as early as the late 50s with Adenauer’s West Germany welcoming such proposals. The post of HR of CSFP manned by Javier Solana will be joined together with the position of the External Relations Commissioner (currently held by Benita Ferrero-Waldner).
Another important point is the creation of the European External Action Service; that is “Eurodiplomats” with European Union embassies around the world. It already has been the practice of EU countries to join their embassies to cut back costs especially in countries that are not of strategic or economics importance to them. Moreover, the Visegrad Four countries signed a pact creating common V4 diplomatic representations. This does not go against the new External Action Service; on the contrary, it can only strengthen the V4 countries’ say towards the bigger diplomatic corps of Western Europe.
The important position of a new permanent President of the EU is another novelty that Lisbon brings. It is a political nomination and an answer to Henry Kissinger’s long time standing question. Now he will get a phone number to Europe, where he can call the President and the Foreign Minister of the EU.
When speaking about the troublesome way Lisbon cleared all obstacles to its ratification, it is necessary to stop at Poland and Czech Republic. Their so called euro sceptic Presidents waited for a long time to sign the treaty. In the Polish case it was conditioned with the outcome of the Irish referendum, on the Czech side the Senators’ complaint at the Constitutional Court. The idea of opting out from the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and President Klaus’ fear that under this, the Sudeten Germans could reopen the dispute about the Benes decrees was answered by the Constitutional Courts ruling. To this question one thing needs to be stressed. Everything can be disputed and reopened. The Sudeten Germans can reopen/question the Benes decrees; what they will not be able to do, is to use the Lisbon treaty to aid them. The Constitutional Court ruled and Czech constitutional lawyers concur that opening the decrees under the Lisbon treaty is de facto impossible.
The theatrical comments of President Klaus saying Czech Republic lost its sovereignty after his signature was added to the Lisbon treaty come from his personality and attitudes yet still are unfortunate. After the sad end of the Czech presidency earlier this year, when the Czech government lost the vote of confidence in the parliament, the Czech Republic needs to recuperate and rebuild its damaged international image and Klaus’ comments do not help this aim. The implementation part is what awaits the EU leaders now. The EU leaders are called to name a president and foreign minister for the bloc at November 19 summit in Brussels. Surely, the personality, leadership style and activity of both will show how much the EU will be visible to the world. DG Relex (Directorate General for External Relations) is now working tirelessly to create the mechanism for the new European diplomatic core and with Lisbon treaty coming to effect on December 1, there is still a lot to be done. One thing is certain; we can expect major changes to the working of this unique supranational body of states. Optimists claim the changes will be to the benefit of all EU citizens, pessimist the contrary. We will see...